The Poppy Foundation

Speciesism is a condition that most of us suffer from to some degree, whether we admit it or not. Joan Dunayer’s book Speciesism makes even the most avid animal defender examine his or her attitudes and approaches to animal rights advocacy.

Speciesism is a very important book. It should be read not only by animal rights activists, but also, and probably more so, by people who don’t often think about the subject.

Dunayer makes some great observations about endangered species and conservation. This has long been an area that I find troubling. A member of a non-endangered species feels just as much pain as a member of an endangered species, and when killed, that animal is just as dead as an animals whose species has been listed as endangered. I find it ridiculous when I hear someone talking about it being acceptable to kill an animal because "that is not an endangered animal." If you are planning to kill an individual, she most certainly is an endangered animal, whatever the status of her species.

Dunayer makes the wonderful point that, because conservationists value endangered species over non-endangered, to be consistent they would have to value the life of an Atlantic salmon over that of a human.

She states at the very beginning her stand on language and how speciesist language is deeply ingrained in our society and contributes to and perpetuates our speciesist attitudes. She abjures the use of the word "animals" instead of "non-humans" and referring to non-humans as "it," etc. Except for one instance, I agree wholeheartedly with her about this (see my essay "Words"). Just the same, her use of "[sic]" every time she quotes someone who uses speciesist language is annoying in the extreme. We know it is not she speaking–it’s in quotation marks, for heaven’s sake. "[sic]" should only be used when there is a danger of the reader misconstruing a grammatical or spelling error or such as being that of the quoter, and not in the original quote.

The one instance where I completely disagree with her about the use of language is the fact that, in claiming that we should call things by their correct names instead of using euphemisms, she believes we should use the word "owner" to describe our relationship with non-humans. She claims that "tabooing the word owner denies enslavement." (p. 158) Undoubtedly, this is related to her belief that we should not live with non-humans as companions. While I agree in the case of exotic animals or those who must be caged or otherwise housed in small, unnatural enclosures, I disagree with regard to dogs and cats. And a study done by FIREPAW indicates that people who think of themselves as "guardians" to their non-human companions are much more likely to treat them better than those who consider themselves "owners." This is another case where her philosophy gets in the way of practical benefit for non-humans.

Another of Dunayer’s positions that troubled me is her total dismissal of Christianity as a speciesist religion. Although I am not Christian and I agree with much of what she says about speciesism in the Bible, I also know that there are Christians who interpret the Bible in a non-speciesist way. One good example is Andrew Linzey. The Bible is interpreted in many different ways, and so much of it is self-contradictory, not to mention the fact that much of it is conveniently ignored anyway. But by dismissing Christianity altogether as speciesist, Dunayer will alienate many Christians, forcing them to chose between their religion and animal rights and causing them to thus justify animal exploitation. And besides, why does she single out Christianity? Most other religions, in particular the other two monotheistic religions, are just as speciesist.

Because most of the examples of Dunayer’s philosophy that I have cited are those I disagree with, one might get the mistaken impression that I do not agree with her in general and do not feel that this book is worthwhile. Nothing could be further from the truth. I do endorse the book as a whole unreservedly. The fact that I, a staunch anti-speciesist and abolitionist, can find so much in this book to debate and disagree with, illustrates the fact that there is much room for nuanced thought in the animal rights movement. People so often tend to see the issues as black and white, but that is not the real case. There are those who will call you "welfarist" and not want to associate with you if you advocate more humane care for animals raised for food, and on the other hand there are those who will call you "extremist" if you feel that this is the wrong approach. There are those who will see you as part of the problem if you don’t go to protests and scream and yell with them. There are those who latch on to any campaign anyone comes up with as helping animals, but which might bear scrutiny (e.g. boycott Canadian seafood). It would probably do us all good to do a little more thinking for ourselves, an little more examination of the implications of some of the campaigns we involve ourselves with. Almost every issue that comes up calls for some intense soul-searching, both individually and collectively, to determine the best approach, the most effective tactics, those that will help the animals the most.

Dunayer is extremely thorough and thoughtful in her examination of speciesism. She spends an entire chapter simply pinning down the definition of the word. Next, she looks at the different types of speciesism: old speciesism, which she defines as that which entails not believing "that any nonhumans should have legal rights or receive as much moral consideration as humans." (P. 9) This, she notes, is expressed in the expression, "the sanctity of human life," which implies that human life alone is sacred. Old speciesists, she explains, believe that humans deserve special consideration simply on the basis that they are human. She examines the different reasons old speciesists give for their attitude, and discusses current law, and shows that even such laws as the Animal Protection Act are old speciesist.

She discusses the problems with a tactic that has become common in animal advocacy, which is to highlight reasons for ceasing animal cruelty that have nothing to do with the animals, such as condemning vivisection on the ground that experiments on animals don’t always extrapolate to humans, or condemning factory farming on the basis that it causes pollution, or meat eating because it is unhealthy for humans. In a wonderful paragraph, she states

In some ways, African-American slavery harmed slaveholders. For example, slaveholders became dependent on slaves’ labor and skills. But 19^th-century abolitionists didn’t focus on slavery’s costs to slaveholders or to Americans in general. They focused on slavery’s immorality. Even if the Holocaust had occurred after environmentalism became mainstream, would anyone have opposed it on the ground that gas chambers polluted the environment? (P. 53)

I truly wish more animal advocates would take this to heart, and begin focusing on the cruelty and immorality of animal exploitation itself, not its effect on humans.

Even more insidious than old speciesism is what Dunayer labels new speciesism. So many people who consider themselves true friends to animals, and true animal advocates, suffer from this form of speciesism. New speciesism calls for rights for some animals, usually based on their perceived "intelligence" or their likeness to humans.

Dunayer reveals new speciesist attitudes in the philosophies of some well-known and well-respected animal advocates, including Peter Singer, whom she quotes as saying that it is acceptable to raise and kill animals for food as long as they "have a pleasant life and are ‘killed quickly and without pain’"; (p. 78) Tom Regan, whom she cites as believing that it is "morally right to save one human rather than a million dogs"; and Steven Wise, whom she says bases giving animals rights based on their ability to "demonstrate human-like mental abilities." (P. 101)

In the last part of the book, Dunayer illustrates what non-speciesism looks like, both philosophically and practically. This, as one who has read her book this far would imagine, is not as simple as it may look on the surface.

My copy of Speciesism is full of margin notes, both stars and exclamation marks (denoting what I see as brilliant insights) and comments criticizing many of her notions.

Tina Clark